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"Don't tax you, don't tax me. Tax that fellow behind the tree."1
Chances are that fellow behind the tree is a private forest owner.2 These
woodland owners increasingly feel pressure due to property taxation and
urban sprawl. In the last century, property owners broke up large indus-
trial forest tracts and abandoned marginal farms. Once abandoned farm-
land "on the hills," owners sold their tracts "for amenity values, recrea-
tional use, and in some cases, timber production." 3 The self-perception of
modern forest owners is evolving to a view of themselves as ephemeral
stewards of the land with a responsibility to enhance future enjoyment
and use of the forests.
Quietly, but steadily, this forest stewardship evolution caused or
coincided with a revolution in the state taxation of forests. A vast major-
ity of the states changed their ad valorem tax rules 4 to encourage the for-
est owner to perpetuate forest land and develop forest management plans
utilizing sound silvicultural practices.
5
SUMMARY
Section I, of this article examines the historical revolution that cre-
ated a different property tax scheme for forest land as it evolved during
*. David J. Colligan, State University of New York at Buffalo, J.D. 1977; a partner in the
Buffalo, New York, law firm of Watson, Bennett, Colligan, Johnson & Schechter, L.L.P. He is a
former director of the New York State Forest Owners Association. He is also Chairman of Reforest
Buffalo, an urban forestry initiative in Buffalo, New York. Visit his website at
www.forestrylaw.com. The author wishes to thank Amanda Fantauzzo, State University of New
York at Buffalo School of Law, Class of 2001, a publication editor of the Buffalo Law Review, for
her excellent research and assistance.
1. George F. Will, Morality and the 'Martini' Lunch, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 17, 1977, at 120.
2. See generally Thomas Lundmark, Methods of Forestry Law-Making, 22 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 783, 784 (1995) (relaying that "[sleventy-two percent of the commercial timberland in
the United Stated is in private ownership").
3. See Hugh 0. Canham, New York State Forest Preserve, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN FORESTS AND CONSERVATION HISTORY 491 (Richard C. Davis ed., 1983).
4. In 1982, Siegel and Kerr found that 39 states possess laws that reduce property taxes for
forest lands. William C. Siegel and Ed Kerr, Update on Property Tax Laws, 88 AM. FORESTS 36,
37-38 (July 1982). See infra Table I, Forest Class or Current Use column shows that this number is
now 47.
5. See infra Table I. Table I lists states that require management plans as a prerequisite to
obtaining property tax relief.
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the twentieth century. Section II reviews the constitutional underpinnings
of the Equal Protection Clause in both State and Federal Constitutions.
Section II then reviews how the courts have interpreted the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in permitting the passage of forest land taxation statutes.
Section III examines the incentives the new tax laws created, such as the
incentive to produce timber and to encourage non-timber benefits. Non-
timber benefits include such benefits as wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic
appreciation. Section III also describes how to use yield taxes to more
fairly tax forest land. Section IV reviews how each state's law has tried
to balance the tension between local issues and state public policy. Fi-
nally, Table I illustrates the current forest taxation statutory schemes of
all fifty states.
6
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE FOREST LAND TAXATION
What a difference a century makes! At the beginning of the last
century, forty-one states had constitutional provisions requiring that the
states equally apply all property taxes.7 Ad valorem taxation is the term
that defines equal taxation of land based on property value.8 Therefore,
owners of forest land at the beginning of the last century expected to be
taxed based upon the relative value of their properties compared to other
similarly situated properties. However, the states often compared prop-
erty forest land to farmland. But unlike farmland, where crops have a
usual rotation of one year9 with annual income to pay property taxes,
forest land's timber has rotations sometimes exceeding one hundred
6. See infra Table I.
7. Forty-one states have constitutional provisions addressing equality of taxation and/or ad
valorem taxation. These states are: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 211), Alaska (ALASKA CONST.
art. VIII, § 17), Arizona (ARiz. CONST. art.9, § 1), Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 5(a),
California (CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1), Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3), Delaware (DEL.
CONST. art. VIll, § 1), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, 1 i1),
Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 5), Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 2), Indiana (IND. CONST. art. X, §
1), Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 5), Kentucky (Ky. CONST. § 171), Louisiana (LA. CONST. art.
VII, § 18), Maryland (MD. CONST. art. XV), Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3), Minnesota
(MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1), Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 112), Missouri (MO. CONST. art. X,
§ 3), Montana (MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 4), Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1), Nevada (NEV.
CONST. art. X, § 1), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. Art. VIII § 1 1), New Mexico (N.M. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1), North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2), North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. X, § 5), Ohio
(OHIo CONST. art. XII, § 2A), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 5), Oregon (OR. CONST. art. IV, §
32), Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1), South Carolina (S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1), South
Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 17), Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art..II, § 28), Texas (TEX. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1-a), Utah (UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 2), Virginia (VA. CONST. art. X, § 1), Washington
(WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1), West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1), Wisconsin (WIS. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1), Wyoming (WYO. CONST. art. I, § 28). The states without any such provisions are:
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont,
8. The term "ad valorem" is defined as "a tax imposed on the value of property." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed. 1990).
9. See generally John H. Davidson, Conservation Agriculture: An Old New Idea, 9 WTR
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 20, 21 (1995) (illustrating the one year time period of crop rotation).
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years' ° with infrequently produced income from the timber harvest." At
about this time, the science of silviculture in this country was rapidly
developing and the highest level of government was recognizing wise
forest management. 12 In a seminal monograph appearing in Roosevelt's
Conservation Commission report in 1909, the director of the United
States Department of Agriculture, Fred Rogers Fairchild, criticized the
wisdom of applying traditional ad valorem taxation methods to forest
land. 13 Essentially, Fairchild concluded that ad valorem taxation acted as
a disincentive to long-term timber management.
14
In 1924, Congress passed the Clarke-McNary Act "to study the ef-
fects of laws, methods, and practices upon forest perpetuation."' 5 In
1935, this Act funded Fairchild to thoroughly examine this subject and
issue another report. 16 The report concluded that the burdensome effect
of the property tax was a serious or insurmountable handicap to forest
perpetuation in private ownership (the "Fairchild Report").' Fairchild
succeeded in pointing out that the difference in timing between the pay-
ment of ad valorem property taxes and the receipt of income from timber
land caused a time bias, effectively inducing timber owners to liquidate
their investments prematurely, therefore, shortening production
rotations. 8 Fairchild also observed that the public recognized the need
for the protection that forests provide against floods, erosion, pollution
and scenic spoliation. 19 He concluded that while these are vitally impor-
tant from the public point of view, they were less important from the
point of view of the private owner, as "the public interest requires not
only less severe cutting, but also as a rule, more expensive cultural op-
,,20erations and methods of cutting.
The report determined ad valorem property taxation of forest land
resulted in deforestation, shorter timber stand rotations, and a conversion
of use coinciding with the growth of suburban America. The ad valorem
taxation method encouraged both residential land development and the
10. See generally Steven A. Daugherty, The Unfulfilled Promise of an end to Timber
Dominance on the Tongass: Forest Service Implementation of the Tongass Timber Reform Act, 24
ENVTL. L. 1573, 1600 n. 145 (1994) (illustrating the Forest Service's prescription of a rotation age of
approximately 100 years for timber production).
11. See FRED ROGERS FAIRCHILD, FOREST TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Dep't of
Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 218, 7 (Oct. 1935); Richard W. Trestrail, Forests and the Property Tax -
Unsound Accepted Theory, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 347, 349 (1969).
12. THEODORE ROOSE"ELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 299, 323-25, 408-27, 431-35 (reintroduced
by Elting E. Morison, Da Capo Press, Inc. 1985).
13. See FAIRCHILD, supra note 11, at 4.
14. See FAIRCHILD, supra note 11.
15. See id. at 5 (quoting from § 3 of the Clarke-McNary Act).
16. See id.
17. Seeid. at 6-10.
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creation of recreational subdivisions, greatly increasing the raw land's
value regardless of whether productive forests existed thereon. 2  The
pressures of suburban development caused forest owners to be unable to
22justify growing timber under the resulting ad valorem tax burden.
As Fairchild observed, it was not within the public interest to pe-
23nalize forest owners. Most of the states realized that to strive for the
public policy goal of forest perpetuation, the ad valorem tax system had
to be modified to tax forest land at less than full market value.24 These
special tax laws were slow in coming because state constitutions had to
be changed in order to accomplish a different method of taxation. 25 State
legislatures did not pass the majority of state forest incentive tax laws
until the 1960's and 1970's.26 Now, forty-seven states27 have carved out
exceptions to traditional ad valorem taxation of forest lands in order to
induce both timber production and encourage the many non-timber re-
lated benefits that forests provide to the public.28
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND PROPERTY TAXES
A. Application to Property Taxes
The last presidential election gave Americans a lesson in federal
constitutional equal protection. 29 The equal protection clauses contained
in the federal and in most state constitutions also apply to state property
taxes. "Perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation
is that people in equal positions should be treated equally., 30 This princi-
ple is termed "horizontal equity". 31 Historically, the courts have left a
determination of fairness in taxation in the province of state
legislatures. 32 "[A] large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature
to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what
21. See Siegel and Kerr, supra note 4, at 36.
22. See id.
23. See FAIRCHILD, supra note 11. at 7.
24. See Siegel and Kerr, supra note 4, at 38.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 63.
27. See infra, Table I.
28. See id.
29. See generally Gore v. Bush, 121 S.Ct. 525, 530, 532 (2000) (holding that (1) having once
granted the right to vote on equal terms, the state may not, under the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, value one person's vote over that of another by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, and (2) when state courts order statewide recounts in Presidential election, equal
protection requires that there be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal
treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied).
30. See John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The Supreme Court and the Property Tax, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 125 (1993).
31. See id.
32. See William C. Cohen, State Law is Equality Clothing: A Comment on Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Company v. County Commission, 38 UCLA L. REV. 87, 99 (1990)
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measures are necessary for the protection of such interests., 33 Parties
have challenged perceived unjust property taxes by bringing Equal Pro-
tection cases.
B. The Ad Valorem Tax System
To review the constitutional challenges to property taxes as they ap-
ply to forest land taxation, one must start with a closer inspection of the
ad valorem taxation system. In a theoretically perfect ad valorem taxa-
tion system, a person who owns land served by the community pays
taxes to the community based on the value of the land owned. 34 In the-
ory, those who own the most valuable property pay the most tax.35
The ad valorem taxation is a two part process first establishing the
value and secondly applying a tax rate expressed in either "mils' '36 or
cents per hundred dollars assessed value to arrive at the imposed tax.
"Traditionally, the base against which the rate is levied is the fair market
value of the property subject to the tax. 37
Fair market value for ad valorem taxation purposes requires a deter-
mination of the property's highest and best use. 8 Ensuring a high Iquality
valuation system demands highly skilled and professional staff. 9 As-
sessing forest land requires highly specialized appraisal skills requiring a
knowledge of land sales, timber markets, and timber measurement tech-
niques. Often the valuation system applied by the taxing authority indi-
cates that the property's current use as forest land is not the highest and
best use. This gives rise to the forest owner's perception that forest land
assessors are treating them unfairly. Further, there is an inherent problem
in valuing property that has not been subject to a recent arm's length
sale. n°
C. Rational Basis Standard
The level of subjectivity of the local assessor has created numerous
constitutional challenges that have proceeded through the courts all the
way to the Supreme Court of the United States.
33. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
34. James S. Wershow & Edward S. Schwartz, Ad Valorem Assessments in Florida -Recent
Developments, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 67,67 (1981).
35. Id.
36. Miller, supra note 30, at 84.
37. Id.
38. See William C. Unkel & Dean Cromwell, California's Timber Yield Tax, 6 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 831, 832 (1978).
39. See generally INT'L ASS'N OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, STANDARD ON PROPERTY TAX
POLICY (1997), at http:www.iaao.org (representing a consensus in the assessing profession and the
objective of these standards is to provide a systematic means by which concerned assessing officers
can improve and standardize the operation of their offices).
40. Miller, supra note 30, at 85.
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In Cumberland Coal Co. v. Bd. of Revision,41 the Supreme Court
found that the local assessor assumed that all coal properties in the town
should be taxed at the same rate, regardless of remoteness or accessibility
of the parcel, costs of the operation of extracting the coal or the avail-
ability of transportation. 42 The Court found this over-simplified subjec-
tive approach was an intentional and systemic under valuation, which, if
proven, violates Federal Equal Protection.43 The Court held a legislature
is not bound to tax every member or no member of a class. It may make
distinctions of degree when it has a rational basis for that distinction.
When subjected to judicial scrutiny, the Court must be presumed to rest
on a rational basis if there is any conceivable state of facts that would
support it.44 We call this the "rational basis" Equal Protection test.
For over fifty-five years, the Supreme Court of the United States
consistently adhered to the deferential rational basis review in tax cases
that did not require "heightened scrutiny," that is, unless the taxation
scheme was "palpably arbitrary" or "invidious., 45 This heightened scru-
tiny shifts the burden to the state to prove a compelling state interest if a
"suspect classification" exists or the law impinges on a "fundamental
interest. 46
Then, in 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
Allegheny case, which held that a West Virginia tax assessor's practices
violated equal protection because certain properties received dramati-
cally higher assessments than neighboring "comparable properties. 47
The Court found that the county assessor determined the appraised value
of the coal company's properties relying heavily on recent sale prices of
the coal company's properties which resulted in assessments thirty-five
times higher than neighboring "comps", 48 which had not generally been
tested for coal. 49 Additionally, the Court found that even though the
similarly situated properties were subjected to regular ten percent incre-
mental increases in assessed valuation, it would have taken 500 years to
equalize assessments between the coal company's properties and neigh-
boring lands.50 The Allegheny Court implied that the Webster County
assessor's actions would not be subjected to constitutional review if he
41. 284 U.S. 23 (1931).
42. Cumberland Coal. Co., 284 U.S. at 24.
43. Id. at 28.
44. Id.
45. See Robert Jerome Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
261, 284-85 n.144.
46. See id. at 278 nn. 99-103.
47. Allegheny Pitt. Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1989).
48. "Comps" is a term of art referring to comparable properties used to compare the subject
tax parcel in order to prove or disapprove valuation fairness.
49. See Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 338, 340.
50. See id. at 341-42.
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had followed the state guidelines and based all coal land assessments on
a "least valuable seam of mineral coal" standard.51
The Allegheny case called into question the ad valorem taxation sys-
tem in general and the special exception statutes that allowed forest own-
ers to elect to assess their forest properties based on methods other than
fair market value. 52 We did not have to wait long to find out if the Su-
preme Court would throw out the rational basis review of tax statutes
from the Cumberland Coal case. The Supreme Court issued its decision
in Nordingler53 in 1992, whereby the Court concluded that the acquisi-
tion cost assessment scheme of California's Proposition 13 has a rational
basis, and thus did not violate the equal protection clause.54 Nordingler
distinguished the Allegheny decision because in Allegheny an individual
local assessor who was not following state law caused the violation of
the equal protection law, while Proposition 13 is a statutory scheme the
voters of the State of California established.55
D. Forest Land Tax Statutes Challenges
The new forest land special tax classification laws do not appear to
apply the heightened standard of equal protection that was a concern
after the Allegheny decision. Before Allegheny, one state court using the
rational basis standard, held that challenging the valuation of timber land
for tax purposes required no judicial interference unless fraud or fla-
56grantly excessive valuations showed an intention to discriminate.
In the 1969 class action suit Weissinger v. White, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found an Alabama state statute unconstitutional because the ad valo-
rem assessment rates ranged from nine to thirty percent.57 This case best
illustrates the effects of rational basis equal protection on the changing58
legal landscape in the field of forest land taxation. As a result, the leg-
islature passed Amendment 373 to the Alabama Constitution which cre-
ated four classes of property for taxation purposes. 59 Class Three in the
scheme was farm, timber, residential and historical property. In an at-
tempt to further subdivide Class Three, the amendment treated farm and
timber property separate from residential and historic land.60 In a follow-
up case brought to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held
that Alabama was justified in the disparate treatment of one-half of the
51. See Glennon, supra note 44, at 292 n.207.
52. See id. at 304-05 n.265.
53. Nordingler v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
54. See id. at 28.
55. See Erin A. O'Hara & William R. Dougan, Redistribution through Discriminatory Taxes:
A Contractarian Explanation of the Role of Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 869, 907-08 (1998).
56. See Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1969).
57. Weissinger v. White, 733 F.2d 802, 804, (11th Cir. 1984).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 805.
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Class Three property for two reasons: (1) individual assessment of in-
come producing property was not administratively feasible; and (2) the
state had a special interest in preserving farm and timber land in an at-
tempt to perpetuate certain desirable uses of its land in the face of eco-
nomic pressures to convert the property to more lucrative pursuits. 61 The
court concluded that any disparity that is rationally related to a permissi-
ble state purpose would pass the test of constitutionality.62 The Alabama
case is consistent with the often-articulated proposition that the Equal
Protection Clause does not preclude states from creating different statu-
tory classifications.63
In 1997, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a forest owner who
claimed to have devoted forty-seven forested acres near downtown
Madison to timber use but had not actually prepared the property for
planting was entitled to receive agricultural use valuation for the prop-
erty.M As a result, the forest owner successfully challenged a revaluation
to $2,525,000 for tax purposes and received an assessment consistent
with her use of the land as forest land.
65
In 2000, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the valuation based
on a "current use" as forest land as opposed to its fair and reasonable
market value was not a constitutional violation even though the property
had curbs and storm sewers the owner installed prior to the timber being
cut. The special jury returned an interrogatory finding that on the tax
record date in 1991 the property was "growing for sale timber and forest
products." 66 The Alabama Court found that using the property as a forest
on the tax date was all that mattered and the value of the surrounding
property was immaterial.6 7
E. Future Challenges
These cases generally indicate property tax laws do not violate Equal
Protection, including forest land incentive statutes. However, if there is
gross discrimination within a class or if a fundamental interest is im-
pinged upon, court may invoke equal protection. The author found only
one state court decision holding that the statute taxing agriculture and
timber land by "current use" is unconstitutional.68
61. See id. at 806.
62. See id. at 806-07.
63. See id. at 805-06.
64. Madison County v. Lenoir, 695 So.2d 596, 596-97, 600 (1997).
65. See Madison Co., at 596, 597, 600.
66. See Delaney's, Inc. & Springdale Stores, Inc. v. Ala., 2000 Ala. LEXIS 401, *11-12
(2000).
67. See id.





A. New Taxation Models
Forest owners have unsuccessfully challenged the ad valorem tax
system on Equal Protection grounds. Despite this failure, a general un-
derstanding has developed that disincentives inherent in an ad valorem
tax system were not meeting the public policy goals to encourage green
space and forest land. This realization led to a borrowing of the European
model wherebY countries tax forest property based upon yields, not fair
market values.
Prior to 1976, California's forest tax scheme was such a confused
mess that three studies were conducted examining whether a new system
could effectively replace the ad valorem tax system. 70 The California
studies supported a yield tax as a form of timber land taxation for three
reasons: (1) the yield tax would not affect timber management decisions
as much as ad valorem taxes, including not penalizing owners who did
not commercially harvest their trees; (2) the yield tax would correct ma-
jor inequities in pre-Forest Tax Reform Act (FTRA) system; and, (3)
collection and distribution at the state level could dispel local concerns
over loss of income because the design of FTRA was revenue neutral.7'
California also had to pass a Constitutional Amendment before enacting
FTRA.
72
B. Severance and Productivity Taxes
Yield taxes come in two forms: severance and productivity taxes.
States charge severance taxes as either a percent of the cut timber sales
price or a tax per unit of harvested wood fiber in lieu of annual property
taxes. 73 Severance taxes have the advantages of timing tax payments with
harvest receipts and collecting the greatest amount from those with the
greatest incomes from their forest lands.
The second form of yield taxes is a productivity tax. The hypotheti-
cal value of the land, as calculated by its expected future yield, forms the
basis for productivity taxes. Productivity taxes are sometimes called
"current use" taxes as they use estimated incomes from the property
based on its current use as a forest.74 Productivity taxes are also com-
monly used to tax agricultural lands which have many of the same public
policy objectives as forest tax laws, such as to encourage agricultural
69. See William C. Unkel & Dean Cromwell, California's Timber Yield Tax, 6 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 831, 839 (1978).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 839; see generally Forest Tax Reform Act, ch. 176, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 373-
420 (1976) (codified as amended at CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 431-37 (Deering 2000)).
72. See id. at 842.
73. See infra Table I.
74. See Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 582 S.W.2d at 948.
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production and preserve "green belts" surrounding urban areas.75 Soil
productivity and capability form the basis of productivity taxes. These
concepts are difficult to apply in practice since the assessor requires a
great deal of knowledge in order to ascertain land values. Many states
have elected to create forest land valuation matrixes76 that state agencies
developed to establish valuations by regions and by soil type or site in-
dex. In theory, productivity taxes incentivize the most productive use of
forest lands provided the productivity taxes do not approach the level of
the ad valorem taxes resulting in voluntary conversions.
C. Green Belt Areas
Many states have used yield taxes as a way to incentivize preserva-
tion of green space. Whether the states term the statutory scheme as open
space, green belt space, vegetated filter strips, recreational open land, or
forest land preserve areas, it recognizes the non-timber values many
owners associate with owing their land. These statutory schemes do not
penalize the land owners or forest owners who value wildlife, recreation,
and aesthetic appreciation more than timber production. They may opt
into the favorable tax schemes and enjoy the tax benefits that flow from
them. Otherwise, the same ad valorem tax pressures would subject these
owners to similar pressures as the forest owner whose primary objective
is timber production. The states tax these properties based upon a current
use theory. The state assumes the owner holds this property for timber
production purposes; therefore, whether or not the owner intends to
someday produce timber off the property, the state incentivizes them to
keep it as forest land and to manage it for future timber and non-timber
benefits. The net effect to the forest owner is that he does not have to pay
potentially higher taxes based upon commercial and residential develop-
ment around the property. The cases cited in the previous section demon-
strate that courts have upheld this strongly indicated public policy which
the state statutory schemes have expressed.77
IV. BALANCING STATE PUBLIC POLICY WITH LOCAL CONTROLS
A. Owner Option
Rather than mandate stewardship responsibilities upon every forest
owner within the state, most states have provided the forest owner with
the option of enrolling their property within the tax incentive program.
The forest owner may opt for this voluntary election creating the classic
75. See, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law §§ 300, 304(1) (2000).
76. A central state taxing authority which establishes values per acre for lands in different
counties or regions using detailed soil maps, agricultural or timber product sale information, and
other relevant, objective information usually sets up matrixes.
77. See discussion of Madison County v. Lenoir, 695 So.2d 596 (1997) and Delaney's, Inc. &
Springdale Stores, Inc. v. Ala., 2000 Ala. LEXIS 401 (2000) infra Part II. D.
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quid pro quo whereby the forest owner receives a lower tax burden in
exchange for good forest stewardship.
B. Management Plans
Many states offering forest land tax incentives have a requirement
that land owners must prepare a management plan in order to be quali-
fied to obtain the special tax benefits. Management plans help land own-
ers think through the issues confronting them as stewards of the land.
Consulting foresters will make recommendations within a management
plan as to wildlife enhancements and/or aesthetic appreciation strategies.
The silvacultural principles, which are now well established, are not gen-
erally known to the average forest owner unless the forest owner is en-
couraged to obtain professional forester advice on how to manage the
land in order to gain the benefit of the tax incentives. However, the level
of plan requirements vary greatly from state to state. Compare Idaho,
78
which merely requires a general statement of eventual timber harvest
intention, to New York, which requires detailed management plans and
the forest owner's active participation while the property is enrolled in
79the program.
C. Time Commitment
At the outset, forest owners in most states have to make a decision at
the outset regarding their willingness to participate in good forest stew-
ardship practiced for an extended period of time in exchange for reduced
property taxes under the various forestry incentive laws. Most states ex-
press this commitment in terms of a minimum enrollment period.80 By
making the enrollment optional, states have essentially given the forest
owner a choice between choosing ad valorem taxation based on the high-
est and best use of the property or choosing tax incentivized forest own-
ership.
A few states have mandatory participation of all forest owners; there-
fore, all forest owners receive forest tax incentives. Some states, such as
California, have required forest commitments in what is called a "Tim-
berland Preserve Zone". 81 Forest owners in California who are not in the
mandatory Timberland Preservation Zone can apply for benefits and tax
incentives but must meet three state mandated criteria. The state also
allows local communities to add two optional criteria for owners who
wish to apply, involving minimum acreage and minimum site character-
78. IDAHO CODE §63-1701(Michie 2000).
79. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAX, §480(a) (2000). See generally New York Dep't of
Environmental Conservation Form No. 81-06-5(6/89)-90 "Certificate Of Approval" (conditioning
approval and continued eligibility upon the work schedule listed on the form).
80. See infra Table I for states that have minimum enrollment periods.
81. Unkel, supra note 67, at 848.
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istics. 82 Note, California does not permit any additional criteria for local
government permissive granting of timber land preservation zone classi-
fication.83
D. Acreage Requirement
Many states have maximum or minimum acreages that are eligible to
participate in the forest incentive tax program of that state.84 Minimum
acreage requirements allow each state to establish its public policy re-
garding what qualifies as forest land in its state. States with low mini-
mum acreages do not appear to be concerned with further fragmentation
of the timber land. Presumably, states with high minimum acreages have
determined that not all forest land in the state is eligible for tax incen-
tives, or they are providing a deterrent to fragmentation. States with
maximum acreage requirements as part of their forest land tax incentive
schemes appear to recognize that owners of large tracks of timber land
are less likely to need or want state tax incentives to apply to their vast
holdings with the co-commitments to management plans and yield taxes.
E. Change of Use Penalties
85
Many states have penalties for converting forest lands to other uses.
Some states call these penalties "rollback penalties," other states refer to
them as "recapture penalties". At least nineteen states have no change of
use penalty at all.8 New Jersey has a short two year rollback8 7 while
Pennsylvania has a seven year rollback.88 Meanwhile, New York appears
to have the most severe penalties as it has a ten year rollback feature,
plus interest. 89 If it is a full removal of the property from the RPTL Sec-
tion 480(a) program, the New York land owner pays an additional pen-
alty equal to two and one-half times the rollback amount. 90 If the land
owner attempts to withdraw a portion of the qualified property, the State
of New York exacts a penalty of five times the rollback figure.9' This
amounts to a penalty of fifty times the current year's tax savings! Other
states having relatively heavy penalties include Hawaii, Washington,
Pennsylvania, Vermont and California.92 In states which have voluntary
participation in the forest incentive programs, the level of participation is
often correlated to the penalty feature alone. For instance, Louisiana has
82. See id. at 853.
83. See id.
84. See infra Table I.
85. See infra Table I.
86. See infra Table 1.
87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8 (West 2000).
88. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5490.5a (West 2000).
89. N.Y REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 480(a) (McKinney 2000).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Siegel & Kerr, supra note 4, at 62.
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eighty percent and Florida has one hundred percent participation.93 New
York, meanwhile, has only four percent of the eligible land enrolled in
the RPTL 480(a) Program.
F. Parcel Eligibility
Most states try to balance state public policy as expressed in its for-
est taxation law against local interest in maintaining and preserving in-
come and other benefits derived through the property tax system. States
that have forest incentive laws often establish some local control, such as
forcing the land owner to register the property on an annual basis95 or
requiring the forest land owner to petition local government to include
96timber land for special zoning designation. By establishing state stan-
dards for which properties qualify, the state effectively overcomes local
resistance to "down zoning' '97 or removal of property from local tax rolls
completely, resulting in tax shifts to remaining R roperty from those own-
ers qualifying for the forest land tax incentives.
Some states have built provisions into their forest tax incentive laws
to help the local communities. For instance, Alabama has a yield tax
premium of approximately fifty percent on both hardwood and softwood
log sales exported from the state.99 This disincentive to perform value
added processing of the raw timber outside the state helps the local
communities retain jobs and is an attempt to stem the tide of rising log
exports that many states are experiencing. Other states, such as Arkansas,
have imposed a $. 15 per acre surtax on all forest land to help defray the
costs of fire protection of those timber stands.1°° Courts have upheld the
cost of fire protection as a property tax component with respect to forest
land after a court challenge. Michigan and Wisconsin have a require-
ment that in order to be eligible for tax incentives, property cannot be
posted, which is one reason cited for low enrollment in those states 102
G. School Taxes
Traditionally, most school districts in this country rely either solely
or in large part upon property taxes generated within the district bounda-
93. Id.
94. Joint Report of the New York State Dept. of Env't Conservation and Bd. Of Equalization
and Assessment on The Forest Tax Laws (Sections 480 & 480a of the Real Property Tax Law) 2
(Dec. 1993) [hereinafter Joint Report, The Forest Tax Laws].
95. See id. at 2.
96. See Unkel, supra note 67, at 853.
97. See id.
98. See JOINT REPORT, THE FOREST TAX LAWS, supra note 92, at 4.
99. ALA. CODE § 9-13-82 (2000).
100. ARK. CODE ANN. §26-61-103 (Michie 2000).
101. See generally State v. Pape, 174 P. 468 (1918); Chambers v. McCollum, 272 P. 707
(1928).
102. See Siegel & Kerr, supra note 4, at 63.
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ries. 0 3 A great deal of tension has developed at the local level between
school districts who rely on property tax revenues as their sole source of
funding and forest owners who are raising trees that will never attend the
local schools. A series of cases that are unrelated to forest tax incentives
may resolve this tension and should have a profound impact on how
states fund local school districts. Essentially, three "waves" of cases have
swept across the United States, challenging the local funding of schools
through levies on local real property tax base. 1°4 The first wave chal-
lenged the state statutes based upon an equal protection theory that the
poorer districts did not fair equally compared to the more wealthy dis-
tricts because they had less tax base to support their educational pro-
grams. The Supreme Court rejected this view that wealth was a suspect
classification because education was not a fundamental interest. °5 The
second wave of cases found that, although the Federal Constitution did
not protect education, certain State Constitutions' equal protection
clauses specifically mention education; therefore, the local school dis-
tricts across the state were entitled to be funded on an equal basis. 0 6 The
third wave of cases all rely solely on the education clause of state con-
stitutions. These cases have held that the state has been responsible
through its actions for a substantial portion of the under funding of
poorer districts resulting in a constitutional violation.
0 7
These new school tax cases challenging local taxation should be a
great relief to forest land owners. Now, through centralized state school
funding, the states can equitably distribute property tax levies throughout
the state. Forest owners will pay their fair share of the school taxes re-
gardless of what percent of the local town's tax base the forest land rep-
resents. School districts in poor rural areas will be assured that their edu-
cation funding will be equal to the wealthier districts within the state
regardless of property tax base and receipts of yield taxes from forest
lands. It is fortunate that trees versus school children will no longer be a
source of local tension.
CONCLUSION
Essentially, there are three methods to choose from to encourage
private forest ownership: regulations, incentives, and voluntary manage-
ment.1°8 All three methods are blended together in the various state laws
to advance public policy objectives. As the Fairchild Report stated, "[t]he
ideal method of taxing forests is that which will require a just contribu-
103. See generally Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
1, 36-40 (2001) (discussing New York State's school aid distribution system).
104. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at 9-17.
105. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973).
106. See generally Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
107. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at 14-17.
108. See Lundmark, supra note 2, at 792.
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tion from forest owners, while being of such form as will not place a
special obstacle (beyond what any just tax must impose) in the way of
best use of the forests and the forest lands from the viewpoint of the
public interest."
'' 9
There is probably no such thing as an ideal law, but a good forest
taxation law should include four essential elements: (1) the law should
base all assessments upon the productive capability of the land; (2) the
laws should compute the assessment values on a statewide basis; (3) the
state law should include some rollback taxes or other penalties so that the
properties do not get prematurely withdrawn; and, (4) the statutes should
protect local public interest without sacrificing too much state control
over the process to ensure equity and fairness.
The last century has witnessed a tax revolt and constitutional up-
heaval in forest taxation. The individual forest owner now has an incen-
tive to be a forest steward who is managing his forest for future genera-
tions to enjoy the many resulting benefits.
109. FAIRCHILD, supra note 1I, at 9-10.
110. See Siegel & Kerr, supra note 4, at 63.
2001] 427
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
TABLE I
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ALABAMA YES UNIT YES NO NO NO YES
ALASKA NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
ARIZONA NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
ARKANSAS YES UNIT NO NO NO NO NO
CALIFORNIA YES 2.9% YES NO NO NO. YES
COLORADO YES NO YES NO NO • 40 AC NO
CONNECTICUT YES 2-!0% YES NO 10 YR .25 AC YES
DELAWARE YES NO YES YES 2YR °10 AC YES
FLORIDA YES NO YES NO NO NO NO
GEORGIA YES UNIT YES NO 10 YR .10.2000 YES
HAWAII YES NO YES YES 20 YR * 10 AC. NO
IDAHO YES 3% YES YES 10 YR *5*5000 YES
ILLINOIS YES 4% YES YES 2YR NO NO
INDIANA YES NO YES NO NO .10 AC. NO
IOWA YES NO YES NO 8 YR *2 AC. YES
KANSAS YES NO NO NO NO *10 AC YES
KENTUCKY YES NO NO NO NO -10 AC NO
LOUSIANA YES 2.5-5% YES YES NO *3 AC NO
MAINE YES NO YES YES 10OYR .10OAC YES
MARYLAND YES NO YES YES NO *5 AC NO
MASSACHUSETr YES 5% YES YES 10OYR -10 AC YES
MICHIGAN YES 5% YES YES NO .20 AC YES
MINNESOTA YES 2.0-10% YES YES 6 YR *5 AC YES
MISSISSIPPI YES UNIT NO NO NO NO NO
MISSOURI YES 6% YES NO NO -20 AC YES
MONTANA YES UNIT NO NO NO * 15 AC NO
NEBRASKA YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
NEVADA YES NO YES NO 3 YR *7 AC YES
NEW YES 10% YES YES NO .10 AC YES
NEW JERSEY YES NO YES YES 2 YR *5 AC YES
NEW MEXICO YES 1/8TH% YES NO 1 YR *1 AC NO
NEW YORK YES 6% YES YES 10 YR *50 AC YES
NORTH YES 6% YES YES 4 YR .20 AC YES
NORTH DAKOTA YES NO YES YES 5 YR *5 AC NO
OHIO YES NO YES YES 3 YR *10OAC YES
OKLAHOMA YES NO NO YES NO NO NO
OREGON YES UNIT YES YES NO ° 10 AC YES
PENNSYLVANIA YES NO YES NO NO .10 AC YES
RHODE ISLAND YES NO YES YES NO .10 AC YES
SOUTH YES UNIT YES NO NO *5 AC YES
SOUTH DAKOTA NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
TENNESSEE YES NO YES YES NO *15 AC YES
TEXAS YES NO YES NO 5 YR NO YES
UTAH YES NO YES NO NO .10 AC YES
VERMONT YES NO YES YES 10 YR *5 AC YES
VIRGINIA YES UNIT YES YES NO .25 AC YES
WASHINGTON YES 5% YES YES 10 YR .20 AC YES
WEST VIRGINIA YES 3.22% YES YES 5 YR -10 AC YES
WISCONSIN YES 5% YES YES 25 YR .10 AC YES
WYOMING YES NO NO NO 2 YR NO NO
